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19541 LEGISLATION
must now choose between fully disclosing information or being cited
for contempt.
There are some who say that immunity statutes are morally
questionable since they result in the Government making "deals"
with "stoolies" and "turncoats." 109 If this be true, we should legis-
late against this "immorality" by placing information gained from
"informers" in the same category as that derived from wiretapping
or illegal searches and seizures. Such an attitude, however, would
thwart legislatures and law enforcement agencies from effectively
carrying out their duties of investigation.
Immunity statutes have been construed so as to give protection
to the witness coextensive to that afforded by the privilege. As fur-
ther construction problems arise it may be well for the courts to
weigh the advice of Chief Justice John Marshall:
When two principles come in conflict with each other, the court must give
them both a reasonable construction, so as to preserve them both to a reason-
able extent. The principle which entitles the United States to the testimony
of every citizen, and the principle by which every witness is privileged not to
accuse himself, can neither of them be entirely disregarded.110
A
EMERGENCY CALLS GIVEN PRECEDENCE ON PARTY LINES
BY NEw YORK STATUTE
Due to the enterprise of American capital, the telephone has be-
come so commonplace in the United States that most people regard
it as a necessity. Although it has been in use for three-quarters of
a century, changing social conditions and improved methods of trans-
mission have prevented the law of telephones from ossification and
rigidity. Since the telephone is essentially an improvement upon the
answer would disgrace him. 12 STAT. 333 (1862), as amended, 2 U.S.C.
§ 193 (1952). See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896). Moreover,
the privilege is personal and cannot be raised to protect others. Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906).
109 See, e.g., King, Inmpntity for Witnesses: An Inventory of Caveats, 40
A.B.A.J. 377, 378-379 (1954). But Dr. Bella Dodd, a former Communist,
told a congressional committee: "I think probably more than anything else
the reason why you are not getting many citizens coming forward to testify
in this Country on the Communist conspiracy is the fear that they have of the
smear and the retaliation which the Communists will have upon them.
"One of the things they do, of course, is to use . . . underworld concepts
of informer, stool pigeon, a person who sings, and so forth... " The Tablet,
Sept. 28, 1954, p. 18, col. 6.
110 United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,692e, 38, at 39-40 (C.C.D.
Va. 1807).
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telegraph, an appreciation of the present legal position of the tele-
phone company is dependent upon a familiarity with the law applicable
to the telegraph.
Originally, a telegraph company was widely regarded as a bailee
of the message, and therefore immune from strict liability,1 while
later opinions have more often adopted the view that it is closely akin
to a common carrier.2 Although a telegraph company is not liable
when it is an act of God which prevents the delivery of a message,3
it may be liable where a third party's negligence makes delivery im-
possible.4 In England, telegraph companies were liable only in
breach of contract,5 but in the United States they are subject to tort
liability as well.6
I See Birney v. New York & Washington Printing Telegraph Co., 18 Md.
341 (1862); Pinckney Bros. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 19 S.C. 71(1883); see Schwartz v. The Atlantic & Pacific Telegraph Co., 18 Hun 157,
158 (N.Y. Gen. T. 3d Dep't 1879); Smithson & Owenes v. U.S. Telegraph
Co., 29 Md. 162, 167 (1868); Dickson v. Reuter's Telegram Co., Ltd., L.R. 3
C.P.D. 1, 7 (1877). Contra: Parks v. Alta California Telegraph Co., 13
Cal. 423 (1859).
2 See, e.g., Freschen v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 115 Misc. 289, 189
N.Y. Supp. 649 (N.Y. City Ct. 1921); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. State,
86 Neb. 17, 124 N.W. 937 (1910); Gillis v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
61 Vt. 461, 17 AtI. 736 (1889) ; see Providence-Washington Ins. Co. v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 247 Ill. 84, 93 N.E. 134, 136 (1895) (". . . [T]hey
exercise a quasi public employment, with duties analogous to those of common
carriers. . . .") ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 44 Neb. 326,
62 N.W. 506, 510 (1895). According to one text, telegraph companies today
actually are common carriers, or "... common transmitters, if they prefer a
distinction without a difference. 3 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE
1411, 1414 (Rev. ed. 1941).
3 Hoaglin v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 161 N.C. 390, 77 S.E. 417,
420 (1913). The telegraph company is not exonerated from liability, however,
if it was negligent as in Fail v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 80 S.C. 207,
60 S.E. 697 (1908) ; or if it had alternate means of transmission available and
failed to use them. Beggs v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 258 Ill. 238, 101 N.E.
612 (1913).
4 Barnes v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 27 Nev. 438, 76 Pac. 931 (1904).
Where the company which receives a message transmits it to another telegraph
company, which negligently fails to send it properly over its wires, the first
company is liable. De Rutte v. N.Y., Albany & Buffalo Electro Magnetic
Telegraph Co., 1 Daly 547, 30 How. Pr. 403 (N.Y. Gen. T. 1866). Where
the military intervenes to prevent delivery of a message, however, the telegraph
company is not liable. Rose Mfg. Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 251
S.W. 337 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
5 Playford v. United Kingdom Electric Telegraph Co., Ltd., L.R. 4 Q.B.
706 (1869). Today, of course, there are no domestic telegraph companies in
England, as they were socialized by The Telegraph Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict.,
c. 73 (§ 4) which made the industry a royal monopoly.
6 De Rutte v. N.Y., Albany & Buffalo Electro Magnetic Telegraph Co.,
supra note 4 (alternative holding) ; New York & Washington Printing Tele-
graph Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. 298 (1860).
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Since, for the purposes of law, the telephone was considered
ejusdern generis with the telegraph,7 many of the same legal principles
were applied to the more recent of the two inventions. Telephone
companies have always been regarded as common carriers by the
courts.$ By this is meant that they are required to serve all who
seek to employ them, without discrimination. 9 A telephone company
which negligently fails to make a connection is only liable if it can be
shown that the damages were proximately caused by its negligence.10
Because of the quasi-public nature of their operations, telegraph
companies have been subjected to anti-discrimination statutes,:" which
have been applied to telephone companies as well.12 These statutes
have been strictly construed; for liability to attach for their violation,
the violation must be wilful.13 Even in the absence of such statutes,
it appears that there is a common-law duty to treat all customers on
equal terms.14 Notwithstanding this general principle of non-
preference among customers, however, many states have by statute
required telegraph companies to give precedence to various classes
of message, chiefly of an emergency nature.15 Others have extended
7Attorey-General v. The Edison Telephone Co., L.R. 6 Q.B.D. 244
(1880). See JoYcE, ELEcnruc LAW 8, et seq. (1900).
8 See Central Union Telephone Co. v. State ex rel. Falley, 118 Ind. 194,
19 N.E. 604 (1889) ; State ex rel. Gwynn v. Citizens' Telephone Co., 61 S.C.
83, 39 S.E. 257 (1901); see State ex rel. Goodwine v. Cadwallader, 172 Ind.
619, 87 N.E. 644, 648 (1909); Miller v. Central Carolina Telephone Co., 194
S.C. 327, 8 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1940); State v. Cumberland Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., 114 Tenn. 194, 86 S.W. 390, 391 (1905).
9 Missouri ex rel. Baltimore & Ohio Telegraph Co. v. Bell Telephone Co.,
23 Fed. 539 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1885), appeal dismissed, 127 U.S. 780 (1887); State
ex rel. Webster v. Nebraska Telephone Co., 17 Neb. 126, 22 N.W. 237 (1885) ;
ree Central Union Telephone Co. v. State ex rel. Bradbury, 106 Ind. 1, 5 N.E.
721, 724-725 (1886).
'oVolquardsen v. Iowa Telephone Co., 148 Iowa 77, 126 N.W. 928 (1910);
Forgey v. Macon Telephone Co., 291 Mo. 539, 237 S.W. 792 (1922); Foss v.
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 26 Wash.2d 92, 173 P.2d 144 (1946)
(alternative holding) ; cf. Emery v. The Rochester Telephone Corp., 271 N.Y.
306, 3 N.E.2d 434 (1936) (defendant held not liable in wrongful death action
for failure to transmit call to physician).
"E.g., N.Y. TRANsp. CRP. LAW § 28; LA. REV. STAT. art. 45, § 45:782
(1950) (telegraphs and telephones) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 237.43 (1947) ; OHIo
REV. CoDE tit. 49, § 4931.17 (1954); see also VT. STAT. § 9734 (1947) (applies
to telephones only).
12See Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Tele-
graph Co., 66 Md. 399, 7 AtI. 809 (1886) ; State ex rel. American Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Bell Telephone Co., 36 Ohio St. 296 (1880).
'1 See M'eyers v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 82 Misc. 266, 143 N.Y.
Supp. 574 (County Ct. 1913).
U4 See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Graham, 1 Colo. 230, 233 (1871);
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 44 Neb. 326, 62 N.W. 506,
510 (1895).
'SE.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §73-1806 (1947); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 237.43
(1945); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. §8-820 (1947); N.D. REv. CODE §8-1002
(1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 173 (1937); The Telegraph Act, 1863,
1954]
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the requirement to telephone companies as well.16 Still others allow
the company to contract to send news items out of the regular order
of messages.17 It has been indicated that telegraph messages of an
emergency nature may properly be granted preference in the absence
of statute.' 8 Undoubtedly the same attitude would prevail in the
case of a telephone call.
As has been mentioned, telephone companies are liable for dam-
ages proximately caused by their negligent failure to make a connec-
tion."9 A less common situation occurs where the connection be-
tween the two telephone stations is prevented through the wrongdoing
of a third party. In Hodges v. Virginia-Carolina Railway Co.20 a rail-
road, in violation of a statute, wilfully cut the line of a public telephone
company. Complainant could have reached a physician whom he had
employed to attend his wife, had the wire been intact. Since it was
severed, the wife died from lack of medical care. It was held that,
if the facts alleged could be shown, the railroad would be liable for
the damages which ensued from its act.
The New York Legislature has recently attempted to cope with
an analogous situation by the enactment of a statute making it a mis-
demeanor to remain on a party line when another person needs it
for an emergency call.2 ' Like that involved in the Hodges case, the
26 & 27 Vict., c. 112, § 48 (gives precedence to Queen's messages).
16E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-1806 (1947); MIcH. Comp. LAWS §§ 28.6,
750.507 (1948); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 4057 (Williams, 1934); TEX. STAT. ANN.
art. 4413(21) (Vernon, 1948); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-48-9 (1953).
17 E.g., N.Y. TRANSP. Coap. LAW § 28; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5651 (1949);
VA. CODE ANN. tit. 56, § 56-469 (1950). In some states such statutes apply
only to telegraph companies. E.g., Micr. Comp. LAWS § 484.165 (1948).
is See Reese v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 123 Ind. 294, 24 N.E. 163,
165 (1890).
19 Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Harris, 214 S.W. 845 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1919) ; see Central Union Telephone Co. v. Swoveland, 14 Ind. App.
341, 42 N.E. 1035, 1041 (1896).
20 179 N.C. 566, 103 S.E. 145 (1920).
21 Laws of N.Y. 1954, c. 572. The statute is substantially identical with
that enacted by the Michigan Legislature in Pub. Acts, 1952, No. 56; MicH.
Comp. LAWS §§ 750.540a, 750.540b (Mason, Supp. 1952). The New York en-
actment adds a new section (§ 1424-a) to the Penal Law, to read as follows:
"1. Any person who shall wilfully refuse to immediately relinquish a
party line when informed that such line is needed for an emergency call to a
fire department or police department or for medical aid or ambulance service,
or any person who shall secure the use of a party line by falsely stating that
such line is needed for an emergency call, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
"2. 'Party line' as used in this section means a subscribers line telephone
circuit, consisting of two or more main telephone stations connected therewith,
each station with a distinctive ring or telephone number. 'Emergency' as used
in this section means a situation in which property or human life are in jeopardy
and the prompt summoning of aid is essential."
The new statute also requires all telephone companies in the State to pub-
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statute is penal in nature. Moreover, it establishes a standard of
care which might well determine the nature of the duty owed to the
plaintiff in any tort action which might arise. While the violation
of a statutory standard will not support a tort action unless the injury
is proximately caused thereby,22 such enactments are, in effect, a
declaration by the Legislature that injury will probably be a conse-
quence of their violation, 3 and it is more than likely that their vio-
lation would weigh heavily with a jury in ascertaining tort liability.
The new statute is designed to cope with a situation which may
be temporary in nature, since party lines are gradually being elim-
inated in this state.24 In addition, it may present enforcement diffi-
culties.25 Nonetheless, it represents a salutary effort to safeguard
life and property by the Legislature, and, as the accompanying guber-
natorial message states ". . . if it should save the life of one sick
person or prevent a home from being burned to the giound, its
enactment would be justified." 2 6
lish a notice in their directories, advising subscribers of the offense provided
for in the enactment.
22 People's Service Drug Stores, Inc. v. Somerville, 161 Md. 662, 158 Ati.
12 (1932) ; Larsen v. Webb, 332 Mo. 370, 58 S.W.2d 967 (1932) ; see Earl W.
Baker & Co. v. Lagaly, 144 F.2d 344, 346-347 (10th Cir. 1944); Milbury v.
Turner Center System, 274 Mass. 358, 174 N.E. 471, 473 (1931).
23 See Butts v. Ward, 227 Wis. 387, 279 N.W. 6, 13 (1938).
24 The New York Telephone Co., largest of the State's 105 telephone com-
panies, is presently engaged in eliminating the 8-party lines which it still
maintains upstate. In New York City, the only party lines now remaining are
2-party wires, while on Long Island some 4-party lines are still in use. There
are 1,406,000 telephones in New York on party lines.
25 See McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y., May 10, 1954, p. A-190.
26 Ibid.
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